Maryland for Fred Thompson

From Fred Thompson’s Blog:

The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities doesn’t change my view of that we need to restrain Iran. The NIE confirms that as recently as the fall of 2003, Iran was covertly working to develop nuclear weapons. Perhaps they have since halted their covert nuclear weapons work, but meanwhile they continue to aggressively pursue a uranium enrichment capability, despite the fact that it makes no economic sense as a civilian program.
This program was begun secretly as part of their larger nuclear weapons program and could be converted to bomb-making in short order. The knowledge and equipment necessary to enrich uranium for civilian nuclear fuel is identical to that used to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb; making fissile material for an atomic weapon just takes a little longer. Iran developed this program covertly and illicitly (in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations) and pursued it for years before the United States and others found out about it. Iran’s transgressions are numerous: it failed to declare its activities, hid key portions of its program, and acquired material and technology illicitly, among other things. Much of this continues to this day.

As recently as two weeks ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran is not fully cooperating with the agency. IAEA Inspectors continue to have limited access to Iranian nuclear sites and their knowledge of Iran’s nuclear activities is “diminishing.” Iran has rejected the further transparency measures the IAEA has requested. Tehran has also refused to bring into force the Additional Protocol—an agreement that would give IAEA greater access to Iranian facilities to determine whether illicit activities are occurring. If all secret work has ended and Iran’s enrichment program is really for peaceful purposes, why this continued secrecy? What is Iran hiding?

Let us be clear about who we are dealing with. Iran has long-wanted to be the powerbroker in the Persian Gulf. Other states in the region know this and fear this. Iranian President Ahmadinejad and the Mullahs who run Iran have pledged to “wipe Israel off the map.” We also cannot forget that Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, and that their support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups, is all about achieving these ends. Iran has been modernizing its military for years, acquiring ballistic missile technology from around the world, and pursuing its nuclear program to facilitate its growing dominance and power. Would a country that is one of the world’s largest producers of oil and natural gas really spend billions of dollars just to acquire civilian nuclear power plants for electricity generation?

As a former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I can tell you that the intelligence business is extremely difficult. Complicating this challenge is our long-standing inability to secure credible intelligence about Iran, North Korea and other “hard targets”. The international community had inspectors in Iraq for years prior to 2003, and U.S. intelligence still got it wrong. ln 2005, the bipartisan Robb-Silberman Commission report underscored that “across the board, the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world’s most dangerous actors.” My experience as the recent Chairman of the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board confirmed this assessment.

Let’s also remember that NIEs are snapshots. As recently as 2005 the intelligence community said that “Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons…..despite its international obligations and international pressure.” The new NIE says Iran “halted” its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 in response to “increasing international scrutiny and pressure.” Both are “high confidence” conclusions; however, both can’t be right.

Even if the current estimate is accurate, too many people are too focused now on the assessment that Iran has “halted” its nuclear program. This is good news if indeed it has, but “halted” is much different than “abandoned.” We were told by the Clinton Administration in 1994 that the North Koreans had halted their nuclear program, and look what happened there. And other questions should concern us as well: is this an Iranian “disinformation” program; has their military program has gone too “deep” for us to detect it; or maybe they “halted” their program simply because they lacked the key ingredient—enriched uranium—that their increasingly successful civilian program is now producing.

All that said, if Iran’s program was indeed halted due to international pressure and scrutiny, now is the time to ramp up the pressure on Iran to abandon its fuel-cycle activities. After all, Iran today has 3,000 centrifuges operational, and continues to accelerate this effort despite two rounds of U.N. sanctions. At this pace, many experts estimate Tehran can produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in a short while. Coupled with reports that Iran acquired a nuclear weapons design from the AQ Khan network, we have much to be concerned about with Iran’s “peaceful civilian” program. Yet in the wake of the NIE’s release, international resolve is likely to weaken (led by China and Russia) giving Iran’s Revolutionary Guard the perfect opportunity to re-start their weapons program.

Everyone should recognize that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons is a threat to peace, security and stability, both for our friends and allies in the region, and for us. And so is an Iran that possesses the ability to build nuclear weapons on demand. There is a lot of consternation these days over the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. Can anyone feel safe with a nuclear-armed Tehran, or even one that can quickly develop the “nuclear option”? We should not be surprised that Israel is challenging this NIE.

The Iranians are hoping we will be foolish enough to forget about their history of deception and the military origin of their ongoing enrichment work. They want us instead to give them the benefit of the doubt from here on out. It would be foolhardy to permit Iran to acquire the capability to enrich uranium on any scale.

Our challenge is to not overreact to any intelligence report, whether it is good or bad. Intelligence is a difficult business at best, and our intelligence community still has a lot of improving to do. Still, the best the NIE tells us that the Iranians made a tactical decision to suspend their program, but we still don’t know if they made a strategic one to abandon it. We need to ascertain Tehran’s ambitions and intentions—that is the key. In the meantime, If we believe that international pressure and scrutiny have been effective, then now is the time to increase it. We must convince the Iranians to abandon their fuel cycle/uranium enrichment efforts, since fissile material appears to be the only ingredient the regime lacks to make a bomb.

The bottom line is that the U.S. must lead. And American leadership requires a Commander in Chief who understands intelligence, foreign policy, and national security, and has experience in all of these areas. The President must reassure our friends and allies in the region, and around the world, that the U.S. will not act precipitously, and at the same time, we will not back away from ensuring Iran lives up to its international commitments and meets international demands in order to preserve peace and stability. At the end of the day, we must hope and work for the best, but plan and ready ourselves for the worst.